Justia Mergers & Acquisitions Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Shareholder Representative Services LLC, acting as the Equityholder Representative, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, Renesas Electronics Corporation. The dispute arises from a 2021 Merger Agreement under which Renesas acquired Celeno Communications Incorporated. Plaintiff alleges that Renesas failed to pay two Earn-Out Milestone payments related to the development of a semiconductor chip, the [REDACTED] Product, as stipulated in the Merger Agreement. Plaintiff seeks damages and specific performance of certain contractual provisions.The Court of Chancery assigned the action to the current court on November 6, 2023. Plaintiff filed its Verified Complaint on October 31, 2023, and Renesas moved to partially dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff then filed a Verified Amended Complaint on February 28, 2024, asserting four breach of contract claims. Renesas sought dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Four. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and Renesas replied. A hearing was held on September 5, 2024, after which the court took the motion under advisement.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court granted in part and denied in part Renesas's partial motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion regarding Counts One and Two, finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the Tape-Out Milestone and Mass Production Milestone were met, despite Renesas's arguments to the contrary. However, the court granted the motion regarding Count Four, determining that specific performance of the meeting requirement was not warranted, as monetary damages would provide an adequate remedy. The court found that the contractual provision establishing irreparable harm was sufficient but noted that the ultimate relief sought was payment of the Earn-Out Amounts, not a meeting. View "Shareholder Representative Service LLC v. Renesas Electronics Corp." on Justia Law

In this case, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV, was formed in 2018 with the goal of merging with a private operating company. In 2019, Hennessy completed its initial public offering (IPO), selling units that included shares of common stock and redeemable warrants. In 2020, Hennessy entered into a merger agreement with Canoo Holdings Ltd., an electric vehicle start-up. The merger was approved by Hennessy's stockholders and closed in December 2020.In the months following the merger, Canoo's new board decided to de-emphasize the company's subscription model and engineering services business line. This decision was announced in March 2021, causing Canoo's stock price to drop. The plaintiff, a Canoo stockholder, filed a lawsuit alleging that Hennessy's sponsor and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose changes to Canoo's business model prior to the merger.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismissed the plaintiff's claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim that Hennessy's directors knew or should have known about the changes to Canoo's business model before the merger closed. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting claims, as they were based on the same insufficiently supported allegations. View "In Re Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

In this case surrounding the acquisition of Twitter Inc., the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff's motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff's claim was without merit.Defendants Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc., and X Holdings II, Inc. agreed to acquire Twitter Inc. pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger (merger agreement). After Defendants' counsel sent a letter to Twitter claiming to terminate the merger agreement Twitter filed a complaint seeking specific enforcement. Thereafter, the deal closed on the original terms of the merger agreement. Plaintiff, who held 5,500 shares of Twitter common stock, brought suit seeking specific performance and damages, claiming that Elon Musk breached his fiduciary duties as a controller of Twitter and that Defendants breached the merger agreement. This Court issued a memorandum opinion dismissing most of Plaintiff's complaint, leaving open the possibility that the damages provision in the merger agreement conveyed third-party beneficiary status to stockholders claiming damages for breach of the agreement. Months later, Plaintiff claimed partial credit for the consummation of the deal and petitioned for mootness fees in the amount of $3 million. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff's motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff's claim was not meritorious when filed. View "Crispo v. Musk" on Justia Law

At issue was the availability of appraisal rights under section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.Section 262 affords stockholders of Delaware corporations a statutory remedy for appraisal of their shares under certain circumstances. The statute provides that appraisal rights shall be available only for the shares of stock of a “constituent corporation” in a merger or consolidation, and the process for determining a stockholder’s entitlement to appraisal contemplates that the stockholder will relinquish its shares in the merger of consolidation. In the instant case, Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. agreed to combine their businesses. Dr Pepper stated that Dr Pepper stockholders would not have appraisal rights under section 262 in connection with the proposed transaction. Two stockholder plaintiffs filed this action challenging that decision. The Court of Chancery held (1) the term “constituent corporation” as used in section 262 means an entity actually being merged or combined and not the parent of such an entity, and therefore, Dr Pepper’s stockholders do not have a statutory right to appraisal under section 262(b) because Dr Pepper is not a constituent corporation; and (2) Dr Pepper stockholders are not entitled to appraisal because they are retaining their shares in connection with the proposed transaction. View "City of North Miami Beach General Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In this action arising out of a reclassification of the shares of NRG Yield, Inc. (“Yield”), a stockholder alleged that members of the Yield board breached their fiduciary duties by approving the reclassification and that NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”), which managed Yield’s daily affairs, breached its fiduciary duty by causing Yield to undertake the reclassification. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) the reclassification was a conflicted transaction subject to entire fairness review; (2) the analytical framework articulated in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), applied to the reclassification; and (3) that framework was satisfied in this case from the face of the pleadings. View "IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against West to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The Delaware Court of Chancery held in this post-trial opinion that plaintiff has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the court can infer that wrongdoing related to the merger may have occurred. The court rejected West's argument that the Corwin doctrine would stand as an impediment to an otherwise properly supported demand for inspection under Section 220. The court explained that any contrary finding would invite defendants improperly to draw the court into adjudicating merits defenses to potential underlying claims in order to defeat otherwise properly supported Section 220 demands. Furthermore, the court should not prematurely adjudicate a Corwin defense when to do so might deprive a putative stockholder plaintiff of the ability to use Section 220 as a means to enhance the quality of his pleading. Therefore, the court ordered a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and directed West to allow inspection of the books and records at issue. View "Lavin v. West Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery dismissed a case brought by Plaintiff, a stockholder in The Fresh Market, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the Market’s directors and that Brett Berry, a former CEO and former vice chairman of the company’s board, aided and abetted that breach of fiduciary duty. The Market was acquired by an entity controlled by a private equity firm, and the founder of the Market rolled his equity ownership in the Market into the acquirer as part of the deal. The court held that because there was no coercion applied to the fully informed vote of the common stockholders ratifying the decision of the directors that the merger was in the stockholders’ best interest and the vote was adequately informed so as to serve as a ratification of the board’s decision, the matter must be dismissed. View "Morrison v. Berry" on Justia Law

IBM's proposed purchase of Merge Healthcare was supported by a vote of close to 80% of Merge stockholders. Former Merge stockholders sought post-closing damages against the company’s directors for what they alleged was an improper sale process. Merge did not have an exculpation clause in its corporate charter, so its directors have potential liability for acts violating their duty of care, in the context of an allegedly less-than-rigorous sales process. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed. Demonstrating such a violation of the duty of care is not trivial: it requires a demonstration of gross negligence, but it is less formidable than showing disloyalty. Regardless of that standard, the uncoerced vote of a majority of disinterested shares in favor of the merger cleansed any such violations, raising the presumption that the directors acted within their proper business judgment. View "In Re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former stockholders of Auspex, filed a putative class action to challenge the propriety of the merger with Teva Pharmaceuticals and seek post-closing damages, alleging that the members of Auspex's board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting senior management to conduct a flawed sales process that ultimately netted stockholders inadequate consideration for their shares. The directors have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting plaintiffs' well-pled facts as true, defendants are entitled to invoke the irrebuttable business judgment rule. In this case, plaintiffs have not pled facts that would allow a reasonable inference that the merger involved a controlling stockholder, much less that a controlling stockholder pushed Auspex into a conflicted transaction in which the controller received nonratable benefits. They are left, then, to overcome the cleansing effect of stockholder approval, which in this case was disinterested, uncoerced and fully informed. View "Larkin v. Shah" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the fair value of stock of ISN Software Corp. (Respondent) held by two minority stockholders, Polaris and Ad-Venture, (collectively, Petitioners) at the time of a merger by which the controller cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority. The Court of Chancery held (1) the method used by the controller to determine the fair value of the stock is unreliable; (2) a discounted cash flow analysis is the most reliable indicator of fair value; and (3) upon consideration of the expert opinions provided by Petitioners and Respondent, the statutory fair value is $98,783 per share. View "In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig." on Justia Law