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Appellants were minority stockholders in First Community Bank of Crawford County (FBC). After First Bank reached an agreement to merge with FCB, First Bank filed an application with the Arkansas State Banking Board. The Board subsequently approved the merger. Appellants filed a complaint seeking review of the Board’s decision, arguing (1) the Board did not adequately fulfill its duties under administrative law in reaching its decision, and (2) the statues and regulations followed by the Board unconstitutionally infringe on the due process and property rights of minority stockholders. The circuit court concluded that Appellants failed to preserve their substantive objections due to their failure to present these objections before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellants’ claims, holding that Appellants’ arguments were not preserved for judicial review. View "Booth v. Franks" on Justia Law

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The court affirmed the issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining the merger of Anthem and Cigna under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on Anthem's failure to show the kind of extraordinary efficiencies necessary to offset the conceded anticompetitive effect of the merger in the fourteen Anthem states: the loss of Cigna, an innovative competitor in a highly concentrated market. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on its separate and independent determination that the merger would have a substantial anticompetitive effect in the Richmond, Virginia large group employer market. View "United States v. Anthem" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a merger agreement under which two companies involved in the gas pipeline business, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (“ETE”), agreed to acquire the assets of The Williams Companies, Inc., (“Williams”). The Merger Agreement signed by Williams and ETE contemplated two steps: (1) Williams would merge into a new entity, Energy Transfer Corp LP (“ETC”); and (2) the transfer of Williams’ assets to ETE in exchange for Class E partnership units “would” be a tax-free exchange of a partnership interest for assets under Section 721(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. After the parties entered into the Agreement, the energy market suffered a severe decline which caused a significant loss in the value of assets of the type held by Williams and ETE. This caused the transaction to become financially undesirable to ETE. This issue ultimately led to ETE’s tax counsel, Latham & Watkins, LLP (Latham) being unwilling to issue the 721 opinion. Since the 721 opinion was a condition of the transaction, ETE indicated that it would not proceed with the merger. Williams then sought to enjoin ETE from terminating the Merger Agreement. The Court of Chancery rejected Williams’ arguments. After review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery adopted an unduly narrow view of the obligations imposed by the covenants in the Agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that if a proper analysis of ETE’s covenants led to a conclusion that ETE breached those covenants, the burden would have shifted to ETE to prove that its breaches did not materially contribute to the failure of the closing condition. Since the facts as found by the Court of Chancery were that ETE’s lack of conduct did not contribute to Latham’s decision not to issue the 721 opinion, the Supreme Court was satisfied that when the burden of proving that ETE’s alleged breach of covenants is properly placed on it, ETE did meet its burden of proving that any alleged breach of covenant did not materially contribute to the failure of the Latham condition. The Court also agrees with the Court of Chancery’s finding that ETE was not estopped from terminating the Agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P." on Justia Law

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IBM's proposed purchase of Merge Healthcare was supported by a vote of close to 80% of Merge stockholders. Former Merge stockholders sought post-closing damages against the company’s directors for what they alleged was an improper sale process. Merge did not have an exculpation clause in its corporate charter, so its directors have potential liability for acts violating their duty of care, in the context of an allegedly less-than-rigorous sales process. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed. Demonstrating such a violation of the duty of care is not trivial: it requires a demonstration of gross negligence, but it is less formidable than showing disloyalty. Regardless of that standard, the uncoerced vote of a majority of disinterested shares in favor of the merger cleansed any such violations, raising the presumption that the directors acted within their proper business judgment. View "In Re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

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After a merger in 1995, William and Patricia Cavallaro received 38 shares of stock in Camelot, the merged company. Their three sons received 54 shares each. When Camelot was subsequently acquired, the Cavallaros received a total of $10,830,000, and each son received $15,390,000. The IRS issued notices of deficiency to the Cavallaros for tax year 1995, determining that Camelot had a pre-merger value of $0 and that when the merger occurred, William and Patricia each made a taxable gift of $23,085,000 to their sons. Therefore, each of the Cavallaros incurred an increase in tax liability in the amount of $12,696,750. The Tax Court ultimately concluded that William owed $7,652,980 and that Patricia owed $8,009,202. The Cavallaros appealed, arguing that the Tax Court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Tax Court correctly determined that the burden of proof was on the Cavallaros; but (2) the Tax Court misstated the nature of the Cavallaros’ burden of proof. Remanded. View "Cavallaro v. Koskinen" on Justia Law

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Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power & Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was a contract dispute between the purchaser (Purchaser) and the seller (Seller) of a corporation pursuant to a corporative merger agreement. The agreement provided for three different liability limitations (damage caps) in the event of Seller’s breaches. Seller breached several requirements of the agreement by failing to use certain accounting principles to accurately establish the financial condition of Seller’s corporation and, accordingly, the appropriate adjustment to the consideration to be paid by Purchaser. The amount of the adjustment was controlled by the indemnity Purchaser was entitled to receive under the relevant damage caps. The circuit court entered final judgment for Purchaser. The agent for the stockholders of Seller and former stockholders of Seller appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly construed the merger agreement as to which damage cap was controlling under the facts of the case. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect damage cap. View "Shareholder Representative Services v. Airbus Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, former stockholders of Auspex, filed a putative class action to challenge the propriety of the merger with Teva Pharmaceuticals and seek post-closing damages, alleging that the members of Auspex's board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting senior management to conduct a flawed sales process that ultimately netted stockholders inadequate consideration for their shares. The directors have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting plaintiffs' well-pled facts as true, defendants are entitled to invoke the irrebuttable business judgment rule. In this case, plaintiffs have not pled facts that would allow a reasonable inference that the merger involved a controlling stockholder, much less that a controlling stockholder pushed Auspex into a conflicted transaction in which the controller received nonratable benefits. They are left, then, to overcome the cleansing effect of stockholder approval, which in this case was disinterested, uncoerced and fully informed. View "Larkin v. Shah" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was the fair value of stock of ISN Software Corp. (Respondent) held by two minority stockholders, Polaris and Ad-Venture, (collectively, Petitioners) at the time of a merger by which the controller cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority. The Court of Chancery held (1) the method used by the controller to determine the fair value of the stock is unreliable; (2) a discounted cash flow analysis is the most reliable indicator of fair value; and (3) upon consideration of the expert opinions provided by Petitioners and Respondent, the statutory fair value is $98,783 per share. View "In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig." on Justia Law

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In 2012 Walgreens acquired a 45 percent equity stake in Alliance, plus an option to acquire the rest of Alliance’s equity for a mixture of cash and Walgreens stock. Walgreens later announced its intent to purchase the remainder of Alliance and engineer a reorganization whereby Walgreens would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a new corporation, Walgreens Boots Alliance. Within two weeks after Walgreens filed a proxy statement seeking shareholder approval, a class action was filed; 18 days later, less than a week before the shareholder vote, the parties agreed to settle. The settlement required Walgreens to issue several requested disclosures and authorized class counsel to request $370,000 in attorneys’ fees, without opposition from Walgreens. The Seventh Circuit reversed approval of the settlement, calling the supplemental disclosures “a trivial addition to the extensive disclosures already made in the proxy statement.” “The oddity of this case is the absence of any indication that members of the class have an interest in challenging the reorganization.... The only concrete interest suggested … is an interest in attorneys’ fees.... Certainly class counsel, if one may judge from their performance in this litigation, can’t be trusted to represent the interests of the class.” View "Hays v. Berlau" on Justia Law